This study presents an empirical analysis of compliance. In the year 2002 the German Corporate Governance Commission introduced a Corporate Governance Code to companies listed on the German stock exchange. Each company in noncompliance with one or more of the recommendations must explain in writing. Regarding the 2003 amended Code, this study identifies the Most Commonly Unaccepted Recommenations (MCURs). Finally it gives some explanation why some companies have good reason not to follow all the recommendations like the German Corporate Governance Commission want them to.
Introduction
German companies faced tremendous changes through recent globalization. Notably there is an increased emphasis on shareholder dependency and corporate ethics. Until recently, economists have described Germany's corporate system as bankbased system (Schmidt, 2001; Hackethal and Schmidt 2000) with only a minor shareholder dependency (Siebert, 2004) .
One systematic method of centralizing power was to hide profits. This was largely legal under bookkeeping rules known as continuance principle system (Kontinuitaetsprinzip). Moreover, because German regulations permit banks to invest in companies while making them loans, the banks could control companies. Thus, even Germany's indexed companies did not depend heavily on their shareholders. In contrast to US or British companies, Germany's indexed companies tended to ignore their shareholders.
Nowadays like in US or Britain indexed companies pursue the advantages a shareholder system provides. Economists cite four factors facilitating this shift: 1. competition for global capital, 2. competition for equity listings among stock markets, 3. influence of globalizing consulting and investment banking services and emulation of 4. generally globalizing US firms and their business practices (Useem, 1998; Phan, 2001, Yoshikawa and Phan 2003) In Germany too, a number of disastrous developments of mismanaging and failures in several German Companies like Holzmann and Manesmann were reported (Lange 2004 This paper serves to point out which recommendations are noncompliant by many companies. The author was motivated to do this study in order to have a clear view where the Code is not followed. Furthermore, it can be argued from this point, whether each of the code recommendations make sense for every single listed stock company.
Theoretical Approach to the Code
The Code can be drawn back of Weber's thought about neo institutional theory. Rational organization leads to isomorphism through three ways: First, through introduction of laws, second through mimetic structures also described as "best practice". Especially when in unsecured situation, companies might copy the behavior of others. Third, isomorphism can be reached through normative similarity of their structure (Weber 1972 Scott, 1995; Walgenbach and Beck 2003) . It consists out of three parts. There are laws from several areas combined together to make it easier for a person concerned to see all the necessary laws in one volume (MUST-part). These laws had to be followed anyway, the only new point is, that one can see them now together in one volume. Second, there are recommendations (SHALL-part) to the companies. This is the part where I focus on in this study. 
Data Sample
The study compiles for 96 German manufacturing companies, 25 out of them are Dax listed (the biggest companies), 41 are M-Dax listed (the following biggest) and 25 were listed at Nemax (relatively new companies). The "comply or explain" statement for Dax and M-Dax listed companies was partly received by Towers Perrin, for Nemax listed companies they were found directly at companies' homepages. In cases where companies did not give numbers but just words, it was sorted according to the paragraphs (like United Internet). The same was done when companies obviously did a mistake with the numbers (like TelesAG). Companies were given a dummy variable "1" if they followed recommendation, otherwise "0". The code contains several recommendations which were split of in 32 parts. Performance Oriented Payment of Auditors (Aufsichtsrat). As in German two tier system, BOD is divided in decision maker (Vorstand) and controlling auditors (Aufsichtsrat), in a similar way as the release of individualized compensation system of BOD-directors to the public, paragraph 5.4.5 recommends that BOD auditors (in Aufsichtsrat) should be motivated of checking the company through performance orientated compensation system. The Code recommends in paragraph 5.4.5 a performance oriented compensation system for auditors.
Proper Release of Accounting Information. Nowadays, release of proper accounting information is vital for investors where they can make their decisions about investments. Companies are recommended to disclose their accounting information after 90 days of fiscal year and their quarterly accounting information after 45 days to the public. This recommendation is written in paragraph 7.1.2 and it is shared by European Union who came up with extra transparency rule where as European companies are supposed to disclose accounting information more frequently (Buchheim 2004 ).
Discussion and Implications
This paper examined Most Commonly Unaccepted Recommendations (MCURs) of German corporate governance code recommendations.
The recommendations of the Code exist out of guidelines offered from scientists, politicians and other pressure groups. As it is not a law but recommendations, the foremost punishment for companies who do not comply with recommendations could be a stock price decline. This is not in line with recent research of Nowak et al. who show in their research of 337 at Prime Standard in Germany that there is no correlation between listed companies who comply with Code recommendations and to their impact at the capital market. A reason for this outcome -so their finding -is a lack of transparency in the market. That is to say, it is a still early discipline of research and documentation, so that capital market might not yet take enough notice of Corporate Governance at all . It is to mention that they included all recommendations. However, for smaller companies with only two or three BOD members it might not make economical sense to establish compensation committees like the Code recommends. In accordance to neo institutional theory, corporations intend to incorporate socially accepted norms (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott 1995) . In this line, neo institutional theorists argue that embedded formal structure rises through institutional expectations. Therefore, accepted norms can give legitimacy, resources and stability to environmental systems (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) . This saying, followers of the recommendations of The Code might be motivated to a less extend through performance for itself but through a gain in legitimacy of a shifting environment. In recent years, German political situation with high jobless rate puts many companies in a sort of "spotlight". Especially bigger German companies like e.g. Siemens could have faced this pressure when individualized compensation scheme of BOD directors became public in Dec. 2004. The government is eager to guide companies to success through correct behavior. In this regard, some companies might accept the Code of not being in public critics even if it is not sure whether complying to these recommendations are helpful for companies economic success or not.
Conclusion
In Germany corporate governance is a very active discussed topic. With establishing The German Corporate Governance Code companies can comply with recommendations or they have to explain if they do not comply. In latter case, they have to report according to 161 stock price company law (Aktiengesetz). There is hope from politicians and big support by labour unions that companies who behave in good faith through complying with the Code, that they will receive better economic success.
In this study, it was focused on the MCURs (Most Commonly Unaccepted Recommendations). In overall companies did not comply mainly four recommendations. In the areas of D&O insurance, open individualized compensation system of BOD directors, performance oriented compensation to auditors and time adequately disclosure of accounting information. Saying this, it is critically to ask, whether all recommendations by the German Corporate Governance Code Commission are helpful for companies in any case. Especially in part of board member transparency of compensation, e.g if companies release individualized compensation system from their BOD directors it might destabilize companies more than it serves for any good. Employees might loose a lot of time and energy for exculpation about their income. BOD directors might have to explain themselves especially in economic difficult times for what they receive the (high) amount of compensation.
